El principio de caridad y los valoresHacia un relativismo más allá de la interpretación

Resum

The Principle of Charity has been defined in, at least, two different ways: a naturalistic one, or a transcendental one. In this paper I will focus on the latter approach, taking Donald Davidson’s arguments and his transcendental interpretation of the principle of charity as a representative case. The principle is applied both to the belief and the evaluative attitudes (wishes) to be able of understand the meaning. Due to the transcendental nature of the principle, understanding and intelligibility are not put on risk, leaving no place to a relevant relativism. I will claim that this relativism can be located in the evaluative element and that its relevance for the study of the meaning is not seen since the transcendental arguments. Taking Damasio’s «somatic-marker hypothesis» I will sketch a proposal about how these evaluative elements could be understood and their roles in a relevant relativism.