Banking Industry Regulation and Strategic Action Fieldsa research agenda for Economic Sociology.

  1. Santana Turégano, Miguel Ángel
Revista:
RIO: Revista Internacional de Organizaciones

ISSN: 1886-4171 2013-570X

Año de publicación: 2015

Título del ejemplar: Cuestiones sobre organizaciones III

Número: 15

Páginas: 29-48

Tipo: Artículo

Otras publicaciones en: RIO: Revista Internacional de Organizaciones

Resumen

This paper examines the evolution of the regulation of the banking industry in the EU after the global financial crisis of 2008. It proposes to analyze the sector as a strategic action field, embedded in a web of fields and where participants differ in their power and influence. The analysis is focused in two policies implemented under the new European regulation, the limitation of the variable remuneration and the introduction of diversity quotas. It follows the policy making mechanism, from the scientific discussion about whether these measures improve the performance of organizations to the adoption of policies that close all controversies in a black box, following ideas developed in the Social Studies of Science (SSS). This inquiry, albeit modest, suggest that a deeper understanding of the regulation of the banking industry could be gained following an approach that combines Strategic Action Fields Theory and Social Studies of Science.

Referencias bibliográficas

  • Black, J. (2012). «Restructuring global and EU financial regulation: character, capacities and learning» in Wymeersch, E; Hopt, K. J. and Ferrarini, G. (eds). Financial Regulation and Supervision, A post-crisis analysis, Oxford, Oxford University
  • Borio, C. (2003). «Towards a macroprudential framework for financial supervision and regulation?». BIS Working Papers, n 129, Basel, Basel Bank for International Settlements).
  • Borio, C. (2011). «Implementing a Macroprudential Framework: Blending Boldness and Realism». Capitalism and Society, Vol. 6, Issue 1, Article 1, 2011. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2208643>.
  • Enriques, L. and Zetsche, D. (2015). «Quack corporate governance, Round III? Bank board regulation under the New European Capital Requirement», Theoretical Enquiries in Law, 16-1.
  • Fligstein, N., and McAdam, D. (2011). «Toward a general theory of strategic action fields». Sociological theory, 29(1), 1-26.
  • Fligstein, N., and McAdam, D. (2012). A theory of fields. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Hopt, K. J. (2012). «Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis» in Wymeersch, E; Hopt, K. J. and Ferrarini, G (eds). Financial Regulation and Supervision, A post-crisis analysis, Oxford, Oxford University
  • Izquierdo, A. J. (2002). «De la fiabilidad. Riesgo financiero y gobierno a distancia», en A. Rubio (ed.), Finanzas y sociedad, Madrid, Paraninfo, 337- 368.
  • Latour, B. (1992). Ciencia en acción, Barcelona: Labor.
  • Masera, R. (2014). «CRR/CRD IV: the trees and the forest». PSL Quarterly Review, vol 67, 271, 381-422 .
  • Portes, A. (2000). «The hidden abode: Sociology as analysis of the unexpected». American Sociological Review, 65(1), 1-18.
  • Santana Turégano, M. and Rodríguez González, P. (2015). «Fictional expectations in economic organizations. A case study in the banking industry». Revista Española de Sociología, 24: 9-23.
  • Stiglbauer, M. and Velte, P. (2012). «The economic versus moral perspective of board diversity: a time for regulation after the financial crisis?» The International Journal of Organizational Diversity, Vol 12.
  • Wymeersch, E; Hopt, K. J. and Ferrarini, G. (eds) (2012). Financial Regulation and Supervision, A post-crisis analysis, Oxford, Oxford University.