Virtudes epidémicas reflexivas. El conocimiento como una cuestión de confianza

  1. Manuel Liz
Journal:
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica

ISSN: 2386-8066

Year of publication: 2016

Volume: 3

Issue: 2

Pages: 243-282

Type: Article

More publications in: Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica

Abstract

According to Ernest Sosa, re ective knowledge would have to be able to integrate some epistemic circularities as virtuous sources of knowledge. We will argue that such re ective knowledge has to be based on some capacities for delegating and relegating in adequate ways the justi cation of our rst-order beliefs. Also, we will argue that to understand those communitarian and temporal capacities as constituting re ective epistemic virtues leads us outside any criterial conception of knowledge. For these conceptions, knowing always requires to know that certain criteria are ful lled. If human knowledge worth of the name unavoidably needs some amount of re ection, and if our re ective knowledge necessarily depends on virtuous delegation and deferring, then at the end of the day knowledge cannot be criterial. Human knowledge is rather a matter of trust.