Reagan's Strategy for North Africa Aggravated the Crisis in Western Sahara

  1. Garí, Domingo 1
  1. 1 Universidad de La Laguna
    info

    Universidad de La Laguna

    San Cristobal de La Laguna, España

    ROR https://ror.org/01r9z8p25

Aldizkaria:
Humanities and Social Sciences

ISSN: 2330-8176,  2330-8184

Argitalpen urtea: 2022

Alea: 10

Zenbakia: 5

Orrialdeak: 294

Mota: Artikulua

DOI: 10.11648/J.HSS.20221005.13 GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openSarbide irekia editor

Beste argitalpen batzuk: Humanities and Social Sciences

Laburpena

President Reagan gave a military boost to relations with Morocco, the likes of which had not been seen since thestart of the Western Sahara conflict in 1975. The Republican president’s strategy was to strengthen his ally so that it mightemerge victorious from the war that had begun with its occupation of the Spanish colony. Reagan was a staunch believer in theuse of force to resolve international conflicts, all of which were viewed from the standpoint of confrontation with the USSR.He did not care about the evidence stacking up against his argument in this case. Little did it matter that the conflict in theSahara showed no signs of belonging to the long list of proxy wars between the two powers. Reality was invented by creatingalternative facts. In this article it will become clear how erratic the US Republican administration’s viewpoint was. The war inthe Sahara should never have been seen as a link in the Cold War, but as a local conflict in a specific region of North-WestAfrica. Such thinking has prolonged this human drama for decades, making it one of the most enduring and longest-lastingwars today

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