Robust Virtue Epistemology and the Ontology of Complete Competences

  1. Modesto Manuel Gómez Alonso
Logos: Anales del Seminario de Metafísica

ISSN: 1575-6866

Year of publication: 2021

Issue: 54

Pages: 489-510

Type: Article

DOI: 10.5209/ASEM.78474 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Logos: Anales del Seminario de Metafísica


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  • Scopus Cited by: 1 (30-08-2023)
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  • Year 2021
  • SJR Journal Impact: 0.138
  • Best Quartile: Q3
  • Area: Philosophy Quartile: Q3 Rank in area: 374/732

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  • Year 2021
  • Journal Impact: 0.110
  • Field: FILOSOFÍA Quartile: C2 Rank in field: 23/99


  • Human Sciences: B

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  • Year 2021
  • CiteScore of the Journal : 0.2
  • Area: Philosophy Percentile: 36

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  • Year 2021
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(Data updated as of 18-04-2023)
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In Judgment and Agency, Ernest Sosa argues for a triple-S structure of complete competences that includes, besides the innermost seat competence of the agent, her overall intrinsic condition (shape) and the right situational factors for the manifestation of cognitive success to occur. Complete competences are context-sensitive. The question is raised whether epistemic competences are extrinsic or intrinsic dispositional properties, as well as whether knowledge is the manifestation of powers of the actual world or whether it is a matter of what happens in modally close worlds. An ontological background for the context-sensitivity of epistemic competences that is compatible with their intrinsic character is set in the context of a general account of dispositions. An actualist conception of knowledge is also provided. On this view, the modal force of knowledge, far from being captured by non-localized possibilities, is rooted in the directedness of powers. This article, thus, aims at making explicit the ontological underpinnings of knowledge in a way that it is consistent with Sosa’s fully dispositional virtue epistemology. To this end, the constitution of complete competences is placed in a proper perspective.

Funding information

This article has been funded by the following Research Projects: «Epistemology of Religious Belief: Wittgenstein, Grammar and the Contemporary World» (PTDC/FER-FIL/32203/2017. Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology-FCT). «Vulnerabilidad cognitiva, verosimilitud y verdad» (FFI2017-84826-P. Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad. Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigación Científica y Técnica de Excelencia. Gobierno de España). «Points of View, Dispositions, and Time. Perspectives in a World of Dispositions» (FFI2014– 57409–R. Gobierno de España. Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad. Programa Estatal de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación). Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca / University of Edinburgh


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