Elusive Aspects in Personal Attributions

  1. Manuel Liz
Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 0210-1602

Year of publication: 2022

Issue Title: The Second-Person Perspective of Psychological Attributions /La perspectiva de segunda persona en las atribuciones psicológicas

Volume: 41

Issue: 2

Pages: 205-230

Type: Article

More publications in: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía


In their recent book, Diana Pérez and Antoni Gomila claim that attributions of psychological properties in the second-person are not reducible to any other kind of attributions. Also, they claim that those attributions play a crucial role in understanding personal interactions and who we are. We analyze some conceptual problems that the notion of second person perspective poses. We argue 1) that there are elusive aspects in the adoption of all kinds of personal perspectives, 2) that those elusive aspects play a crucial role in understanding personal interactions and who we are, and 3) that those aspects articulate the very distinction between the various personal perspectives.

Bibliographic References

  • ANSCOMBE, E. (1975), “The First Person”; in Guttenplan, S. (ed.), Mind and Language; Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • CASTAÑEDA, H.-N. (1967), “Indicators and Quasi-indicators”; American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 4, nº 2, pp. 85-100.
  • CHALMERS, D. (1996), The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory; New York, Oxford University Press.
  • GEACH, P. (1956), Mental Acts; London: Routledge.
  • HOWELL, R. (2010), “Subjectivity and the Elusiveness of the Self”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 40, 3, pp. 459-83.
  • JENSEN, K. (2019), “Double Deixis in Second Person Pronouns as a Metaleptic Device”; Globe: A Journal of Language, Culture and Communication, 8, pp. 1-19.
  • KRIPKE, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  • MARTIN, M. (2017), “Elusive Objects”, Topoi, 36, pp. 247-71.
  • PÉREZ, D., & A. Gomila (2022), Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction; London, Routledge.
  • PERRY, J. (1979), “The Problem of the Essential Indexical”; Noûs, vol. 13, nº 1, pp. 3-21.
  • SEARLE, J. (1978), “Literal Meaning”; Erkenntnis 1, pp. 207-224.
  • SEARLE, J. (1995), The Construction of Social Reality; New York: Free Press.
  • SOSA, E. (2009), Reflective Knowledge. Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Vol. II, Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press.
  • VÁZQUEZ, M. & M. LIZ (eds.) (2015), Temporal Points of View. Objective and Subjective Aspects; Berlin, Springer.
  • WILLIAMSON, T. (2000), Knowledge and Its Limits; Oxford: Oxford University Press.